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THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST
CORPORATIONS ON THEIR MEMBERS
IN ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS
In many of the early attempts to assess foreign stockholders
by receiver's suits, courts were reluctant to proceed against them.
The petitions of creditors were more favorably regarded; yet
even they, not infrequently, failed to compel stockholders to per-
form their just obligations. At a later period the courts realized
that both receivers and creditors must be treated with greater
consideration; meanwhile the old doctrine concerning the con-
clusiveness of a judgment against a corporation on its members,
which is the basis of proceedings against them for assessments,
is on the judicial anvil assuming a more pliable form. From this
labor has appeared from time to time a new limitation or modifica-
tion; the existing rule may therefore be thus expressed: a judg-
ment against a corporation rendered without mistake,' by a court
of competent jurisdiction,2 untainted by fraud,
3 on a contract
intra vires,4 is conclusive with respect to the amount of the cor-
poration's indebtedness and the propriety of the procedure.
The occasions are few in which a mistake has been committed
by a court in rendering judgment serious enough to serve as a
justifiable ground for stockholders to resist paying their assess-
ments. No one will question the justness of this limitation, and
therefore whenever a mistake has been shown, courts have not
failed to give to stockholders the full benefit arising from the dis-
covery.
The occasions are more numerous in which judgments against
corporations have proved an insufficient basis against their mem-
bers from lack of jurisdiction. Of course this difficulty is funda-
mental, and whenever the defect is shown, the worthlessness of
'Merchants' Bank v. Chandler, 19 Wis., 434; Wilson v. Kiesel, 9
Utah, 397, and 164 U. S., 248, dismissing appeal.
2Fogg v. Ellis, 6i Neb., 829; Schertz v. First Nat. Bank of Chester,
47 Ill. App., 124; Ball v. Reese, 58 Kan., 614; Steffins v. Gurney, 61 Kan.,
292; American National Bank v. Supplee, 115 Fed., 657; Hancock Nat.
Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S., 64o.
3 Martin v. Wilson, 58 C. C. A., 18i, x84.
4 Ward v. Joslin, 186 U. S., 142; Warrington v. Ball, 33 C. C. A., 6o.
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the judgment appears. This class of cases, therefore, has not
been difficult for courts to adjudicate.5
Again, if fraud or collusion enter into a judgment, it would be
contrary to elementary principles to predicate any subsequent
action thereon. The cases of this character are numerous, and
many of them have been already mentioned.6
The reasons are not less cogent for declaring that a judgment
against a corporation which rests on an ultra vires contract ought
not to serve as a basis of assessment on a member. This limita-
tion has the sanction of the highest federal tribunal.7
A judgment cannot operate against a member unless he is one.
Therefore, when he is sued for an assessment, he may always
show that he is not a member; either that he never was, or that
he has parted with his stock through voluntary action, or by
operation of law." Says Chief justice Knowlton in Howarth v.
Lombard :"
"Of course the defendant may show if he can that he is not a
stockholder of the bank, or not a stockholder for so large an
amount as alleged, or may make any other defense that is personal
to himself. But we are of opinion that, as a member of the cor-
poration, he is bound by the decision of the court of the State
where the corporation was organized, made in administering its
affairs in insolvency and determining the amount of its assets and
liabilities and the amount of the assessment which should be made
upon the stockholders."
The logical deduction from this rule is, a member can also prove
that he does not own as much stock as may be asserted or al-
leged.10
5 McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., 130 Mich., 111, 1i6; Ward v.
Joslin, 44 C. C. A., 456.8 McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., 13o Mich., III, 116; Bohn v..
Brown, 33 Mich., 257; Slee v. Bloom, 20 Johns., 669; Bissett S. Ky. River
Nay. Co., I5 Fed., 353.
7 Ward v. loslin, 186 U. S., 142; Marion Trust Co. v. Blisk, 7o Ind.,
686; American Nat. Bank v. Supplee, 115 Fed., 657. Contra, Baines v.
Babcock, 95 Cal., 581.
SKing v. Cochran, 76 Vt., 41; Howarth v. Lombard, i75 Mass., 570;
Straw and Ellsworth Mfg. Co. v. Kilbourne Boot and Shoe Co., 8o
Minn., 125; Giving v. Red River Lumber Co., 105 Miss., 336; Brown v.
Traill, 89 Fed., 641; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn. 454.
9 175 Mass., 570; Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River R. Co., 8o
Minn., 32.
10 King v. Cochran, 76 Vt., 141; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass.,
57o; Straw and Ellsworth Mfg. Co. v. Kilbourne Boot and Shoe Co., 8o
Minn., 125; Saylor v. Commercial Bkg. Co., 38 Or., 204.
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As he is permitted to prove that the debt upon which judgment
was obtained was fraudulent, so can he prove that it has been paid
or discharged;" he is relieved from paying by the statute of
limitations.'
2
We have now reached one of the two great battle grounds of
judicial controversy. To what extent is the amount of a judg-
ment against a corporation conclusive on its members? Three
opinions are maintained. ' The Nebraska view is: "An assessment
made by the court on the stockholders of an insolvent corporation
is a conclusive judicial determination only to the extent that it
ascertains the amount of the corporate assets and liabilities and
declares the necessity for making the assessment ordered."'" By
this view a stockholder is not personally bound in any manner by
the judgment. To sustain this view are cited several cases from
which, however, with one or two exceptions, it is difficult to
extract such a rule. It is true that this view has the sanction of
the Supreme Court of Missouri, for in Wilson v. St. Louis & San
Francisco R. R. Co., the court declared that a stockholder is not,
in any sense, a party to the judgment, rendered against a corpora-
tion to which he may belong.14 The same view has been enter-
tained by Justice Canty of Minnesota in a dissenting opinion.' 5
Another case is Pannoyer .v. Neff, which was an action to re-
cover a tract of land.'8 The plaintiff asserted title by a patent of
the United States, while the defendant's title rested on a sheriff's
deed given in execution of a judgment recovered against the
plaintiff. The effect of a judgment against a corporation in no
way entered into the case.
Another case was the Great Western Telegraph Co. v. Purdy,'
7
which was a bill in equity by some members of the company to
compel the issue of shares to them, and to set aside as fraudulent
a contract by which the company had agreed to transfer all its
shares to others. A decree was entered setting aside the con-
"Martin v. Wilson, 58 C. C. A., 181, 184; Barron v. Paine, 83 Me., 312.
12 Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U. S., 329; Schertz v. First
Nat. Bank of Chester, 47 Ill. App., I24.
13 Commonwealth Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayden, 6i Neb., 454, 457;
Lund v. Ballard, 8o Neb., 385.
14 io8 Mo., 588; Ball v. Breese, 58 Kan., 614.
15Langworthy v. Garding, 74 Minn., 325, 332; Steifins v. Gurney, 6I
Kan., 292.
16 95 U. S., 714, 723; Clark v. Ogilvie, 63 S. W. (Ky.), 429.
171 62 U. S., 329; Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky., 625, and cases cited
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tract and ordering shares to be issued to the petitioners, and the
election of a new board of directors. Afterwards a supplemental
bill was filed by other stockholders, alleging fraud and misman-
agement by the new directors, insolvency of the company, and
praying for the appointment of a receiver. The court without
notice to the petitioners in the original bill, appointed a receiver,
and made an order for an assessment on all the stockholders.
"The order was not," so the court declared, "and did not purport
to be, a judgment against any one. It did not undertake to de-
termine the question whether any particular stockholder was or
was not liable to any amount. It did not merge the cause of
action of the company against any stockholder on his contract of
subscription, nor deprive him of the right, when sued for an
assessment, to rely on any defense he may have in an action upon
the contract. In this action, therefore, brought by the receiver,
in the name of the company, as authorized by the order of assess-
ment to recover the sum supposed to be due from the defendant,
he has the right to plead a release, or payment, or the statute
of limitations, or any other defense, going to show that he is not
liable upon his contract of subscription." This case may sustain
the Nebraska view to some extent, but only a partial answer is
given to the question, for nothing more was needed to determine
the case. Could the stockholder show that his liability, if once
existing, had ceased by operation of the statute of limitations?
And the court answered in the affirmative. The court did not
attempt to show that defenses are denied to a stockholder by the
rendition of a judgment against his company; nor are we justi-
fied in assuming that its silence should be construed as an acqui-
escence in the view ascribed to it by the Nebraska tribunal, espe-
cially in the clear light of three other decisions cited by the
Nebraska court, which will now be noticed.
The first of these is Howarth v. Angle,"8 which was an action
by the receiver of a bank in the State of Washington against a
stockholder living in New York. "It was not necessary," said
Justice Vann, "that all the stockholders should be before the
Washington court when the order was made appointing the
plaintiff receiver and giving him authority to sue, any more than
when a decree in bankruptcy is made, which binds all who are
not parties the same as those who are. The judgment may be
regarded as a proceeding in rein binding all the world so far as
Is 162 N. Y., i79; Merchants' Bank v. Chandler, 19 Wis., 434.
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title to the assets of the corporation is concerned, and according
to the decisions of the highest courts of the State where it is
made, the so-called statutory liability of stockholders is part of
the assets."
The second case is Howarth v. Lombard,1 a Massachusetts
adjudication, in which Chief justice Knowlton said:
"The court of Washington, acting under its general authority
in such administration, is the only tribunal which has jurisdic-
tion to determine the amounts due creditors, and to collect and
apply the assets of the corporation. The undertaking of the
stockholder relates to the payments of amounts, so to be ascer-
tained. The ascertainment is like a common case of a judgment
against a corporation which is binding on stockholders. The
members of such corporations, as well as the corporations them-
selves, are within the jurisdiction of the local court so far as is
necessary for the determination of the rights and liabilities of
the corporation and its members among themselves. In reference
to this kind of liability such decisions and orders are binding on
stockholders who are not before the court otherwise than by
virtue of their membership in the corporation. That such adjudi-
cations are binding upon absent stockholders in reference to
assessments for unpaid subscriptions has often been expressly
decided."
The third case is Ball v. Breesc.2 0 The stockholders of a bank
against which a judgment had been rendered on a certificate of
deposit sought to show that it had been issued without authority,
and therefore was not a valid indebtedness of the corporation.
The trial court ruled that the stockholders could make any
defense which the bank itself could have made, and admitted testi-
mony to prove the defendant's contention. But the ruling was not
sustained by the court of review. That court asked the questions,
"What effect is to be given to the judgment against the corpora-
tion in a proceeding to enforce the statutory liability? Is it to
be deemed conclusive upon the stockholders? or can they go
behind it and compel creditors to re-litigate the questions de-
termined between the corporation and himself ?" And the court
thus answered: "The rule appears to be well settled, and the
courts seem well nigh unanimous in holding that the judgment
is conclusive upon the stockholders as to the liability of the
corporation, except for collusion or fraud, and, of course, a
judgment is of no force where there is a lack of jurisdiction.
19 175 Mass., 570.
20 58 Kan., 614.
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The ruling proceeds upon the theory that the corporation repre-
sents its stockholders within the limits of its corporate powers.
Through its officers and agents it can make contracts binding
upon its members, and as it has to bring and defend suits in
regard to any interest of the corporation, its action in that
respect, if there is good faith, necessarily binds the stockholders
as to any matter in litigation."
If the Nebraska view were generally entertained the difficulty
in collecting assets from the stockholders would be greatly in-
creased, a result that would have a disastrous effect on the credit
of corporations. The double liability has broadened their founda-
tion among creditors whereby their members have profited; and
when overtaken by disaster it is not creditable to the law to find
for them ways for escaping their just obligations.
The second view is that the judgment against the corporation
for the amount is only prima facie evidence of the truth in a suit
against a stockholder for his assessment. This rule has the
support of several jurisdictions. 2' It was early adopted by the
courts of New York,2 2 but instead of assuming a permanent
place in the jurisprudence of the State, it was questioned and
modified. The Court of Errors, reversing Chancellor Kent, held
that the stockholders were concluded by the judgment against the
corporation, 2 and this ruling was sustained on another occasion.24
Then followed a change, the court holding that the judgment was
not even prima facie evidence of the validity of the debt.22 Later
there was a return to the former view. 2 0 At last, the question
21 WIeatley v. Glover, 125 Ga., 710; McBryan v. Unitersal Elevator
Co., 13o Mich., Ix; Schocffer v. Missouri Home Ins. Co., 46 Mo., 228. In
the Wheatley case a creditor of a bank obtained a judgment against it for
services rendered after the bank was placed in the hands of a receiver.
This judgment, though prina facie conclusive on the question of the in-
debtedness of the corporation, did not deprive a court of equity sitting
in another State of the right to determine whether the claimant's right
of action was such as to bind the stockholders in a proceeding to enforce
a stockholder's subscription and statutory liability. Covell v. Fowler, I44
Fed., 535. In McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., 130 Mich., III, 117,
the court says: "When a stockholder can show, even aliunde the record,
that the judgment is wholly void, he may do so as a defense "to his
liability as a stockholder."
22 Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns, Ch. 366.
23 i Johns., 456, 473; and 20 Johns., 669.
24 Moss V. Oakley. 2 Hill, 265, 267.
22. Moss v. Oakley. 5 Hill, 131.
26 Moss v. McCullough, 7 Barb., 279.
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came before the present Court of Appeals. Three of the judges
held that the judgment was prima facie evidence of the amount;
four refused to attach to it even that much weight.
2 7 And this
view has received its sanction in later cases. In Howarth v.
Angle,28 a recent determination of the court, it was declared that
in such a suit against a stockholder he may "controvert all the
essential facts, such as insolvency, the amount of the deficiency,
and the like, whether they are established by the judgment ap-
pointing the receiver or not."
The third view is that the judgment is conclusive of the amount
within the limitations mentioned in the first statement of the
rule.29 But as these cover most of the cases in which the amount
27 Belmont v. Coleman, 21 N. Y., 96. In McMahon v. Macy, 51 N. Y.,
155, the court held that a judgment against the company was a prima
facie evidence of its existence, but a stockholder in an action against him
was not thereby prevented from showing that the company was not
properly organized, besides other defences, For a review of New York
cases see opinion of Gray, Com., in above case, also Miller v. White, 57
Barb., 5o4, and Belmont v. Coleman, i Bos., 188. In Hastings v. Drew,
76 N. Y., 9, the court still wavered over the effect to be given to such a
judgment.
28 162 N. Y., 179.
29 Nichols v. Stevens, 123 Mo., 96; Schofield v. Excelsior Oil Co., 27
Ohio C. C., 347; Castleman v. Templeman, 87 Md., 546; Straw and Ells-
worth Mfg. Co. v. Kilbourne Boot and Shoe Co., go Minn., 125; Swing v.
Red River Lumber Co., 105 Mo., 336; Hendrickson v. Bradley, 29 C. C. A.,
3o3; Verner v. Simpson, 68 S. C., 459, 46o, and cases cited. In Kansas
its conclusiveness is declared by statute. Dexter v. Edmunds, 89 Fed., 467.
"The great weight of authority supports the doctrine that the judgment,
in an action by a creditor against a corporation, in the absence of fraud
and collusion, pronounced by a court having jurisdiction, is conclusive
of the amount and validity of the claim as against stockholders who are
made defendants in a suit to reach corporate assets wrongfully with-
drawn and in the hands of stockholders." Montgomery v. Whitehead, 40
Col., 320, 322, citing Singer v. Hutchinson, 183 Ill., 6o6; Bissitt v. Ky.
River Navigation Co., 15 Fed., 353. In Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed., 747, 757,
Judge Aldrich says: "It has been repeatedly held, and the great weight
of authority is, that a judgment against a corporation in favor of a
creditor, without notice to a stockholder, conclusively establishes the fact
of indebtedness, while, in a comparatively few jurisdictions it is treated as
prima facie evidence only" Citing, Flash v. Conn., IO9 U. S., 371, 380;
Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn., 454; Holland v. Duluth Iron Co., 65 Minn.,
324; Grund v. Tucker, 5 Kan., 614; Thayer v. Printing Co., io8 Mass.,
523, 528; Came v. Brigham, 39 Me., 35; Milliken v. Whitehouse, 49 Me.,
527, 529; Bullock v. Kilgour, 39 Ohio St., 543; Bank v. Warrel, 52 Mich.,
557, 561; Henderson v. Turngren, 35 Pac. 495 (Utah) ; Bissitt v. Ky. River
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has been the chief matter in controversy, this view yields nearly
the same results as the other, that the judgment against the
corporation is essentially nothing more than a prizna facie judg-
ment against its stockholders. Still, the results have not always
been similar from applying these two supplementary or subsidiary
rules to the principal one. Thus it has been held that a judgment
against a bank, adjudging it liable for assessment as a stockholder
in another bank, is conclusive upon its stockholders with respect
to such liability, and a stockholder who is sued upon such judg-
ment in another jurisdiction to enforce his statutory liability
cannot set up the want of bank power to subscribe to the stock
of another corporation.3"
Again in a determination of this character by the New Jersey
Court of Errors the court remarked:
"The proper tribunal to ascertain the amount necessary for
these purposes is a court of equity, since courts of law have no
procedure adapted to the marshalling of assets and liabilities
requisite in such a calculation. The ascertainment may be made
on a petition filed by the receiver against the stockholders in the
suit wherein the corporation was adjudged to be insolvent, for
it seems to be settled that a stockholder is so far an integral part
of the corporation that, in view of the law, he is to that extent
privy to those proceedings; -and when in such a suit an assess-
ment on the stock has been ordered by the court to meet corporate
liabilities, and an action is brought against a stockholder to
collect his quota, he cannot then question the propriety of the
assessment.
3'.
In Ohio the findings and judgment in a mortgage that had been
assumed by a corporation and foreclosed was held to be con-
clusive against the stockholders of the corporation with respect
to the assumption of the debt, and they were thereby precluded
from interposing any defense that might have been set up by the
corporation in the foreclosure proceeding. 32
Nay. Co., 15 Fed., 351, 361; Wilson v. Coal Company, 43 Pa., 424; Don-
worth v. Coolbaugh, 5 Iowa, 30o; Bank of Australasia v. Nias, 16 Q. B.,
717; Borland v. Haven, 37 Fed., 394; Powell v. Railway Co., 38 Fed., 187;
Tabor v. Bank, io C. C. A., 429; McVacker v. Jones, 7o Fed., 754; Mort-
gage Co. v. Woodworth, 79 Fed., 951; Guerney v. Moore, 131 Mo., 65o;
Heggie v. Association, 107 N. C., 581; Warrington v. Ball, 33 C. C. A.,
6og; Bradley v. Eyre, ii Mees. and Wels., 432.
30 Martin v. Wilson, 58 C. C. A., 181.
31 Cuinberland Lumber Co. v. Clinton Hill Lumber Mfg. Co., 57
N. J. Eq., 627, 629, citing Hawkins v. Glenn, 1O5 U. S., 319; Hood v. Mfc-
Naughton, 25 Vroom, 425.
32 Gaw v. Glassboro Novelty Co., 20 Ohio C. C., 416.
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Likewise in an action to enforce the liability of stockholders
after judgment had been rendered against a corporation for its
indebtedness, a stockholder was not allowed to show informality
in the execution by the corporation of its notes representing the
debt.3 3 Howarth v. Lombard is one of the headlands on this
subject in which Chief Justice Knowlton has remarked:
"We are of opinion that, as a member of the corporation, he
is bound by the decision of the court of the State where the
corporation was organized, made in administering its affairs in
insolvency, and determining the amount of its assets and lia-
bilities and the amount of the assessment which should be made
upon the stockholders." 34
The rule applied by the United States Supreme Court is not so
clearly defined, except in administering the national banking
law. The court has exercised liberal authority in reviewing judg-
ments on which assessment proceedings have been based; perhaps
the New York view, as declared in Howarth v. Angle, may be
seen reflected in the federal cases. In one of them a national
bank went into voluntary liquidation in September, 1873. Before
that time it had become liable to a state bank as guarantor on
notes made by a third person, which were discounted by the
state bank. In August, 1874, the maker of them was released
from further liability by the acting president of the national bank,
who, however, attempted to continue the bank's liability thereon.
In May, i88o, a judgment was obtained by the state bank against
the national bank and its stockholders to enforce their statutory
liability. It was held that the judgment against the bank was not
binding on the stockholders in the sense that it could not be re-
examined; that the bank's guaranty on the notes was released
by the release of the maker, and that the rights of the stock-
holders could not be affected by the acts of their president after
the bank had gone into liquidation.33 In other than national bank
cases the view of the Supreme Court reflects more clearly the
law of the State in which the cause of action has arisen.
Again, is there any distinction between the conclusiveriess of a
judgment against a corporation in which the directors were
served with the process, or a receiver? Judge Aldrich, speaking
for the Circuit Court of Appeals, has thus answered the question:
a3 Steflins v. Gurney, 6i Kan., 292.
3 I75 Mass., 570.
3- Schrader v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank, 133 U. S., 6j.
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"We fail to discover any reasonable distinction between the
rule of conclusiveness in respect to a judgment for indebtedness
against a judgment or decree against an insolvent corporation
represented by a general receiver, who is the quasi-judicial re-
ceiver of the corporation and its interests."36
How far is the decree of a corporation's insolvency or the
amount of its indebtedness, determined in such a procedure, bind-
ing on its members in subsequent assessment proceedings? Gen-
erally, such a judgment or decree has been regarded the same as
a judgment against it by a creditor for a debt which is not paid,
and serving as the basis for his proceedings against them. In
other words such action is a substitute for that of creditors in
obtaining a judgment. Its conclusiveness is measured by the
same principles.37 When, therefore, a judgment for the amount
due from a corporation is only prima facie evidence of the fact,
an insolvency decree is regarded in the same manner.38
The other battle ground relates to the notice that must be given
to stockholders to render the judgment against the corporation
binding on them.39 The more general rule is that notice to the
corporation is notice to the members. "A stockholder of the
company," says the Circuit Court of Appeals, "is equally bound
and concluded, for the reason that he is an integral part of the
corporation, as, in contemplation of law, he was before the court
in all the proceedings touching the body of which he was a mem-
36 Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed., 747, 757; Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy,
i62 U. S., 329, 336.
37 Converse v. Ayer, 197 Mass., 443, 455.
38 Booth v. Dear, 96 Wis., 516; State v. Union Stock Yards State
Bank, io3 Iowa, 549; Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y., 179.
39 Converse v. Ayer, 197 Mass., 443, 455, citing Howarth v. Lombard,
175 Mass., 570; Glenn v. Williams, 6o Md., 93; Hawkins v. Glenn, r3
U. S., 319; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S., 64o; Bernheimer v.
Converse, 2o6 U. S., 516; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn., 454, 462; Mer-
chants' Nat. Bank v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 90 Minn., 144; Calo-
way v. Glenn, io5 Ky., 648; Castleman v. Templeman, 87 Md., 546;
Langworthy v. Garding, 74 Minn. 325; Marson v. Deither, 49 Minn., 423;
Straw and Ellsworth Mfg. Co. v. Kilbourne Boot and Shoe Co., 8o
Minn., 125; Parker v. Stoughton Mill Co., 9I Wis. 174; Mutual Fire Ins.
Co. v. Phoenix Furniture Co., io8 Mich., 170; Warner v. Delbridge, iio
Mich., 590; Irvine v. Putnam, 167 Fed., 174; Goss v. Carter, 156 Fed.,
746; Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, i62 U. S., 329; Hale v. Hardon,
37 C. C. A., 24o; Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me., 498. Note 3, L. R. A., 694.
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ber."40 Thus in an action by a creditor against a corporation in
which a judgment is rendered declaring the corporation insolvent
and a receiver is appointed, a shareholder is a party defendant by
representation and consequently cannot dispute the validity of
the receiver's appointment, in an action against him to collect
an unpaid subscription.
4 1
But some jurisdictions still insist that actual notice must be
served on the members in order to bind them by a judgment
rendered against their corporation.
42
The conclusiveness of the judgment against the corporation
affects the stockholders in the same manner whether his liability
is for an unpaid subscription for his stock, or for an additional
sum, usually not greater than the par value of the stock. Says
the New York Court of Appeals:
40 Hendrickson v. Bradley. 85 Fed. 508, 516; Sanger v. Upton, 91
U. S., 56; Wilson v. Seymour, 22 C. C. A., 447. Said Jackson, J., in
Stutz v. Handley, 41 Fed. 537: "The judgment cannot be re-litigated in
this case, for the reason that the defendants, as shareholders, being rep-
resented by the corporation iii that suit, have already had their day in
court on this question."
41 Fish v. Smith, 73 Conn., 377; Howard v. Glenn, 85 Ga., 238.
42 Stockholders are not bound by a judgment against a corporation
in an action to which they are not in fact parties in respect to rights
arising out of contracts other than subscriptions for stock, for example,
a contract which is the basis of a mechanic's lien on the property of the
corporation. Andrews v. National Foundry and Pipe Works, 22 C. C. A.,
2io. In a proceeding against a stockholder at the instance of a creditor,
to enforce the individual liability under the contract, a judgment against
the corporation establishes prima facie the amount and validity of the
debt. When the stockholder was not a party to the suit against the cor-
poration, and had no opportunity to defend in that suit he may, by way
of defense in a suit against him, set up not only any fact which would
absolve him from liability under the charter but also any fact which
would establish that the corporation was not liable upon the debt which
was the basis of the judgment. Wheatley v. Glover, 125 Ga., 7io. In
Converse v. Aetna Nat. Bank, 69 Conn., 163, the court, after declaring
that the Minnesota law providing for the appointment of receivers with
authority, to proceed against non-resident stockholders was unconstitu-
tional, held that the objection incurred by the defendant stockholder was
that of a surety, and was not due to the corporation, but only to its cred-
itors or to their representatives; that as the assessment order by the
Minnesota court did not deal with obligations due to the insolvent cor-
poration or with the disposition of its property, the defendant was not a
party to the action in that State on the theory that it was represented by
the insolvent corporation, and therefore the order did not conclude the
amount of his contractual obligation.
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"There is no substantial difference between the liability for an
unpaid balance on a stock subscription, and the liability for the
unpaid deficiency of assets assumed by the act of becoming a
member of the corporation through the purchase of stock, from
which a contract is implied to perform the statutory conditions
upon which the stock may be owned. The express promise runs
to the corporation, and may be enforced by it, while the implied
promise runs to the creditors, and may, according to the common
law of the State wherein it was made, be enforced for the benefit
of creditors, or by a receiver of the corporation. ' '
4 3
Formerly a distinction was drawn in the mode of procedure
against him for the two liabilities, the courts declaring that a
receiver, assignee or creditor could proceed against him for the
unpaid subscription, because it was a liability due to the corpora-
tion, while creditors alone could sue for the double liability be-
cause it was an asset intended solely for their benefit.44 As a
receiver or assignee had no title thereto, he had no right to sue
for the recovery of this asset. To overthrow this distinction,
which was not based on a sound theory, has required many a legal
battle; and where the courts have failed, the legislatures have
completed the work. In Cushing v. Perot,45 it was held that a
single foreign creditor of an insolvent company in Kansas could
not maintain an action in Pennsylvania to enforce the statutory
liability of a stockholder residing in that State after a receiver
had been appointed by the Kansas court havink jurisdiction over
the corporation; but that the right to sue for that purpose was in
the receiver. The court,. speaking through Chief Justice Mitchell,
said:
"A receiver represents not only the corporation, but all its
creditors, and as to the latter it is his duty to receive all the
assets available for their payment. For this purpose he suc-
ceeds to all their rights and has all the power to enforce such
43 Howarth v. Angle, I62 N. Y., 179;. Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn.,
462; Straw and Ellsworth Mfg. Co. v. Kilbourne Boot and Shoe Co., 8o
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452; Bristol v. Sanford, 12 Blatch., 341; Jacobson v. Allen, 2o Blatch.,
341; Brown zi. Traill, 89 Fed. 641; Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S., 222; Glen v.
Marbury, 145 U. S., 499; Hale v. Harden, 37 C. C. A., 240.
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rights that the creditors had before his appointment had in their
own behalf, even though such powers be beyond those which he
has as the representative of the corporation alone. As each
creditor may sue, the right is equal in all and common to all, and
hence the receiver who represents all alike is the proper party to
assert the common right and pursue the common remedy for the
common benefit."
More recently the highest tribunal has pronounced the same
opinion in considering the question of making personal service
on stockholders in order to bind them in a judgment against the
corporation. justice Day said:
"Nor can we see any substantial difference in this respect be-
tween a liability to be ascertained for the benefit of dreditors upon
a stock subscription and the liability for the same purpose which
is entailed by becoming a member of a corporation through the
purchase of stock whereby a contract is implied in favor of
creditors. The object of the enforcement of both liabilities is
for the benefit of creditors, and while it is true that one promise
is directly to the corporation but is for the benefit of its creditors,
either liability may be enforced through a receiver acting for the
benefit of creditors under orders of a court in winding up the
corporation in case of its insolvency."
'46
In some States the distinction has been overthrown by statute;
in others the courts, seeing the unsubstantial nature of the dis-
tinction and the manifest gain to justice by overthrowing it, have
not hesitated to act even if in so doing they were obliged to
overrule contrary decisions made only a short time before. As
Justice Day remarked: "The object of the enforcement of both
liabilities is for the benefit of creditors," and there never was any
sound reason for shutting the doors of justice against a receiver
who wished to compel a stockholder to pay his double liability
and permit him to sue for an unpaid subscription:
Lastly, a judgment against a corporation in some jurisdictions
does not prevent a stockholder from setting off against the
assessment a claim he had against the corporation.47 This doc-
46 Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S., 516, 533, To the same effect
are Irvine v. Putnam, 167 Fed., 174; Converse v. Mears, 162 Fed., 767;
Goss v. Carter, 84 C. C. A., 402; Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me., 498; Walters v.
Porter, 3 Ga. App., 73, 75; Moore v. Ripley, io6 Ga., 556; Marion Trust
Co. v. Blish, 170 Ind., 686, containing an elaborate review of the cases.
47 Boyd v. Hall, 56 Ga., 563; Pierce v. Topeka Commercial Security
Co., 6o Kan., 164; Abbey v. Long, 44 Kan., 688; Jerman v. Benton, 79
Mo., 148; Am. Mortgage Co. v. Brower, 32 So. (Miss.), 9o6; Strauss v.
Denny, 95 Md., 69o; Cahill v. Original Big Gun Assn., 94 Md., 353; Brown
v. Traill, 89 Fed., 641; Straw and Ellsworth Co. v. Kilbourne Boot and
Shoe Co., So Minn., 125.
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trine is denied in other jurisdictions, based on the sound reason
that the original subscription, as well as the secondary liability,
is a trust fund for the benefit of creditors which cannot be
impaired by any transaction between the immediate parties.
48
In a larger number of jurisdictions stockholders are forbidden
to set off the indebtedness of their corporation to them against
their unpaid subscription.49 Why should not the liability be
regarded as a promise for the benefit of creditors in both cases?
On what correct principle can the delusion be justified that the
promise is indeed a promise to pay a stock subscription if needed
to pay the debt of the corporation, but not a promise to pay the
additional sum, the double liability, if needed to discharge the
corporate indebtedness?
What, then, is the present legal liability of stockholders in
insolvent corporations for assessments? First, by statute, com-
mon law, or comity their liability for the statutory sum beyond
the original amount subscribed, as well as for a deficiency, in
their subscriptions, can be enforced in most of the States by a
statutory receiver without much regard to the domicile of the
stockholders, whether they are living in the State where the
corporation is domiciled, or in another State. The federal
courts, however, still deny the authority of a chancery receiver
to enforce both liabilities, while strongly emphasizing the right
41Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y., 19o; Parker v. Carolina
Say. Bank, 53 S. C., 583; Ball Electric Light Co. v. Child, 68 Conn., 522;
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Bausman v. Kinnear, 24 C. C. A., 473, revg. 73 Fed., 9; Thompson v. Reno
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mont Land Co., 55 S. C., 78; Macungic Say. Bank v. Bastian, IO Pa.
Week Notes, 71; Humboldt Safe Deb. Co.'s Estate, 3 Pa. Co. Ct., 621;
Whittington v. Farmer's Bank, 5 Har. and J., 489; Colorado Fuel Co. v.
Sedalia Smelting Co., 13 Col. App., 474, 479; Singer v. Given, 61 Iowa, 93;
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ig Eq., 449; Calisher's Case, L. R. 5 Eq., 214. Contra-Salina Nat. Bank
v. Prescott, 6o Kan., 490, 495; Shields v. Hobart, 172 Mo., 492.
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of a statutory receiver to enforce both liabilities against stock-
holders.50
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin still resolutely adheres to its
early position concerning the double liability of a stockholder-
that it is statutory, that the remedy to enforce it is exclusive and
therefore cannot be enforced in the courts of that State against
a stockholder of an outside insolvent corporation. 51 The con-
stantly lengthening array of adjudications by the courts of
almost every State in the Union, that such liability is essentially
contractual and the remedy therefor transitory, has not yet led a
single judge to retreat from his position.52 Of course, a State
that refuses to recognize a statutory receiver from another State
to sue a stockholder who may reside within its jurisdiction must
expect the stockholders of its corporations residing elsewhere to
be treated in like manner. How their escape will work has thus
been described by Judge Quarles in a recent decision:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that in securing stock
subscriptions little attention is paid in this commercial age to
State lines. The stockholders of a Wisconsin corporation may
be largely resident in Illinois or other adjoining States. If in
case of insolvency there be no way to reach non-resident stock-
holders, then complete immunity will be enjoyed by them who
may in many instances hold a large fraction of the stock."' 3
Secondly, while the right of a statutory receiver to sue for the
liabilities of stockholders, as above described, is almost every-
where recognized, the basis of his action, the judgment of the
court on which he proceeds, is conclusive against stockholders
only to a limited degree. In some States a stockholder is per-
mitted to go as far in defending himself from liability as the
corporation could have gone in the original controversy, the
original judgment can be attacked by a member collateral not-
withstanding the federal constitutional requirement, and the
case be tried over again so far as he is concerned, in a suit against
him, whenever such a course of procedure is deemed needful for
his protection. This is the extreme form of the rule and pre-
50 See Belfe v. Rundle, lO3 U. S., 222; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall., 203;
Converse v. Mears, 162 Fed., 767.
51 Hunt v. Whewell, 122 Wis., 33.
52 One Justice, Dodge, has been opposed to the Wisconsin rule from
the beginning.
53 Converse v. Mears, 162 Fed., 767, 774.
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vails notably in New York, 4 Iowa,5 5 Nebraska, 6 and South
Carolina.57 In most of the States, however, conclusiveness of a
judgment against a corporation has some meaning left in a suit
against a stockholder, though the limitations or modifications of
the old rule are so numerous that no stockholder is likely to
suffer injustice from its application. Whether such a judgment
be regarded as conclusive against him, or only prima facie evi-
dence, if he has any real defense to make, the courts everywhere
evince a disposition to learn what it is and to give him the benefit
of it. Yet the way is not yet clear of difficulties. For example,
a corporation may be held for a debt that would not be regarded
as valid in another State where a stockholder lives, and may,
therefore, form the basis, or part thereof, of an assessment
against him. But there is a partial answer: When he became a
member, he submitted to the laws governing the corporation,
even though his liability might be greater than the members of
corresponding corporations living in his own State.
Albert S. Boles.
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